Syndicates of Capital

States are no longer the highest form of power globally. Power has shifted to wealthy individuals who work in groups and operate across borders.

On January 17, 1961, the first democratically elected leader of Congo was murdered.

$24 trillion of natural resource wealth sits within the Democratic Republic of Congo.¹ By contemporary estimates, the most of any state in the world. The people of Congo have scarcely enjoyed the wealth of the land they inhabit, Belgium established colonial rule in 1908 and multinational corporations proceeded to extract resources and exploit labor. Upon taking office as Prime Minister in 1960, Lumumba challenged this scheme, and declared independence from imperial rule.

Patrice Lumumba was killed shortly after this. His assassination was ordered by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).²³

Syndicates of Capital

A new world order is here. States (countries) are no longer the highest form of power globally. Power has shifted to wealthy individuals who work in groups and operate across borders: syndicates of capital.

Syndicates of capital cannot be categorized as legal or illegal. They exist primarily in the extralegal sphere, where either no regulations apply to their behavior or, where laws do exist, there is no entity powerful enough to enforce them in a manner that asserts control over the syndicates’ behavior.

In many occasions, capital is both the power source for syndicates, and the shared goal. Wealthy individuals form syndicates if their strategic objectives align. Those objectives typically revolve around securing new capital flows and preserving existing ones. Syndicates’ power is vast but fragile. If all members of a syndicate were cut off from accessing capital and the resources they control, they would lose their power.

Author’s Note: ​​Sorry to disappoint the conspiracy theorists, but I am not speaking of secret societies, the illuminati, or a cabal. Syndicates of capital do not hide their power, nor do they operate in secret. Their multi-billion dollar deals and contracts are publicly disclosed. They are also not united in ethnic background, religious, or political beliefs.

It is not enough to say: ‘democracies are being replaced with oligarchies because wealthy individuals have too much power in society.’ That may be true, but is not the full picture. Oligarchies are states run by a small group of wealthy individuals. That may accurately describe the politics of one nation, but it does not suffice to describe how power is organized on a global scale.

‘Global oligarchy’ also falls short of describing how power is organized in our world, because there is not one small group of wealthy individuals, there are many, and they compete. Still, the identification of oligarchs is useful for global political analysis because many of the oligarchs within a state also operate globally as leaders or members of syndicates of capital.

The new world order emerged before it could be identified. Platitudes like: “our world has gone crazy,” served as an emotional crutch, and an implicit acknowledgement that we lack a sound analysis of contemporary global power. What has felt like an ineffable force, an inexplicable undercurrent of darkness, is the ambiance of global dominion by syndicates of capital.

Though abstract, examining how global power is organized is essential to understanding the world we live in. Developing a coherent framework for evaluating global affairs allows us to more effortlessly make sense of current events. You’ll be surprised how quickly things click and how easily your mind makes connections when you absorb the news with a conception of syndicates of capital.

Theoretical Framework

Since 1648, global power has been organized in an anarchic system of states. Not ‘anarchy’ in the sense of chaos, but anarchy in the sense that no higher authority controlled states’ behavior. While international organizations exist, they do not rival the power of states. Instead, they provide the institutional structure necessary to facilitate agreements among them. International laws only apply when states enforce them.

American political scientist Joseph Nye identified the three different forms in which power has been organized globally: an imperial system, a feudal system, and an anarchy of states.⁴ Nye’s analysis is widely accepted, and foundational for the fields of political science and international studies. Syndicates of Capital serves as an extension of Nye’s contributions, not a refutation.

Despite globalization, states have not developed a functional framework for democratic decision making at the international level, though there is a common delusion that exists. Multilateralism, the collaboration of states toward shared goals, has been the most effective way states exert control over other states. The United Nations is an institution that facilitates multilateralism, not global democracy.

Rather than states cooperating to develop a system of global governance, or succumbing to exogenous threats to sovereignty, state power eroded from within. Official government leaders today have less power than wealthy private citizens who demonstratively exert more control over economic policymaking and the use of military force. State leaders often directly serve syndicates of capital instead of the public or the state, though some try to do both.

State-level puppeteering is never the extent of syndicates’ power, but government leaders’ power rarely extends beyond the state, unless working with a syndicate. Syndicates of capital use state power where useful or necessary, but circumvent the state wherever possible.

The end the anarchic system of states is difficult to identify precisely because syndicates did not replace states. Instead, syndicates developed a new global power structure that includes states. The transition occurred slowly and quietly, unlike the clear conception of the anarchy of states, marked by the signing of the peace of Westphalia in 1648 which established the global norm of state sovereignty.

The shift toward syndicates of capital began around the 1920s, and completed sometime before 2020. Syndicates started exercising power over states in the 1920s, and within one hundred years, were using legitimate force at the global level, independent of states.

To understand how systems of global power change, we can learn from previous transitions. Sociologist Max Weber defined the state as a human community with a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.⁵ “Physical force” does not only refer to police, militaries, security, etc., Weber considers economic systems an essential component to states’ monopoly on physical force. Weber points out that when the feudal system was replaced by an anarchic system of states, economic control shifted to state leaders:

[Translated from German] ...the state has combined the material means of organization in the hands of its leaders, and it has expropriated all autonomous functionaries of estates who formerly controlled these means in their own right.⁶

Post-1648, feudal lords/kings no longer directed the means of production, running the economy became the exclusive domain of state leaders.

Which came first, economic or military control? Were states able to take control of economic production because they had a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in a given territory? Or, was controlling the economy a necessary precursor to establishing a monopoly on violence? That debate is an interesting one, but not the point here.

A monopoly on physical force is the consistency across all three previous forms of global power. In an anarchic system of states, state leaders controlled economic systems. In a feudal system, feudal lords/kinds did. In an imperial system, empires did. Global power belongs to whoever exerts the most control over economic systems and militaries.

Today, power over economic decision-making has certainly shifted to syndicates of capital. Most official state leaders do not control the material means of production. Two important economic conditions allowed syndicates to hoard capital. 1) The existence of global financial infrastructure, allowing for the transfer of currency across borders and overseas, and 2) a global system of financial regulation does not exist.

On some occasions, leaders of syndicates possess more wealth than small states. That reality alone indicates a collapse of the nation-state, and a transition from the anarchic system of states to syndicates of capital.

State control over militaries is a global norm, though a fading one. The military industrial complex analysis brought us closer to discovering that, for the past century, syndicates have forced states to outsource military control to syndicates. This includes: technology innovation, weapons manufacturing, and even geopolitical strategy and foreign policy.

Syndicates actions independent of states are usually complimented by the coerced or willing support by states. State leaders cooperate with syndicates to increase the power of their regime and/or for personal financial gain. Private individuals choose to belong to syndicates, pledging more loyalty to their syndicate than the nation(s) they are citizens of.

Liberal Hegemony

Syndicates of capital did not spontaneously alchemize upon required conditions materializing, political ideology pushed people to build the foundation necessary to create this new world order.

The dominance of liberalism was essential for syndicates of capital to emerge. Though the two political philosophies are complimentary, ‘liberalism’ here refers to a global historic political philosophy, which is different from American liberalism within the U.S., for example, some older conservatives within the U.S. are classic liberals.

Liberalism, as categorized by Harry Chernotsky and Heidi Hobbs, is a political philosophy that stems “from the democratic tradition that emphasizes the potential for cooperation among states.”⁷ Liberals focus on states’ central role in world affairs have cost them power globally. Their worldview fails to capture our new reality, though it helped create it.

In the mid-nineteenth century, a new iteration of liberalism emerged: neoliberalism. While believing in state sovereignty, neoliberals simultaneously believe states have a duty to establish and maintain the fundamentals of a “good” society according to liberal values: individual liberty, democracy, secularism, privatization, and free enterprise. The liberal worldview emphasizes individual liberty while leaving little room for the economic self-determination of states, or cultural relativity of their political processes.

Liberals insist that a right to sovereignty is lost when any of the fundamental principles of liberal society are missing within a state. This is when liberals label countries ‘failed states,’ and insist intervention by other states is justified. For example, if a state nationalizes natural resources through legitimate democratic processes, and therefore jeopardizes free enterprise (resource extraction by global ‘market’ forces), that state loses their right to liberty and self determination.

At the global level, liberalism allows states to enjoy individual liberty or sovereignty only conditionally. The liberty is lost once they produce policies that prevent private control of capital. Within a liberal state, an individual has a right to their own political views, so long as they do not act on any which are incompatible with liberal philosophy.

This is a key contradiction of liberalism: state sovereignty and individual liberty are conditional on compliance with liberal ideology. This is why interventions, though illiberal in nature, have been entirely compatible with, and at times driven by, liberal political philosophy.

Liberalism was the driving dogma behind the establishment of free markets globally, which, in practice, was the violent enforcement of resource extraction and labor exploitation my multinational corporations. These conditions facilitated the accumulation of global capital in the hands of the few. Those few formed syndicates. Therefore, neoliberal hegemony catalyzed the shift of how world power is organized, facilitating the fall of an anarchic system of states, and the rise of syndicates of capital. Liberalism effectuated a new world order in which liberalism is obsolete.

The Rise of Fascism

The global rise of fascism is not a response to neoliberal hegemony. Instead, it is a response to the emergence of syndicates of capital. Reclaiming national identity is a desperate attempt to return power to the state. By returning military and economic control to state leaders, fascists could actually check the power of syndicates. This is where liberals fall short, their laissez fare approach to economic regulation insists they should not put their hands in syndicates’ pockets.

Though nationalists could threaten syndicates’ power by returning the monopoly on military force and economic decision making to state leaders, that playbook has generally failed in the west. Syndicates respond by directly working with fascist leaders before they take office to ensure these policies never materialize. Leaders of syndicates have carefully traded power and capital with heads of state in exchange for deregulation and preservation of syndicates’ global control.

Liberalism declining while fascism spreads is not indicative of changing moral values among the masses. Unlike liberals, who tend to ideologically match liberal leaders, fascist leaders differ greatly from their ideologically inconsistent base.

Fascist followers react to material conditions, while fascist demagogues weaponize reactionary behavior. Modern states have the material means to cover the basic needs of their citizens and beyond, but existing systems fail to allocate resources accordingly. This is a political choice, not always made by the leaders of a state, sometimes it is made for them, through multilateral economic coercion.

Manufactured economic scarcity has produced a fear for survival in the populace. That fear has been preyed on by political actors, who direct blame to global factors, like migration. “Globalism” is a consistent political enemy by the far right. This discourages the public from looking globally for any political answers, which is why leaders of syndicates favor anti-globalist ideologies — any meaningful analysis of power across borders reveals their control. The spread of open-minded thinking that centers our shared humanity is an existential threat to syndicates.

Syndicates deem globalization an enemy for a different reason than the masses. Globalization that involves the increased efficacy of international financial regulation is a direct threat to their power.

Syndicates actively work to spread narratives in media that preserve their global power. This includes religious doctrine, factual and non-factual news reporting, economic theory, and political philosophy. This is why media campaigns by billionaires are no longer confined to an election cycle, or even one country.

While there are genuine ideological fascists who do not cooperate with syndicates, they protect syndicates’ power by demonizing globalism. When any right-wing nationalist, communist, or socialist leader rises and truly attempts to threaten syndicates’ power or capital flows, syndicates coup or kill them.

Syndicate Motivations

The behavior of syndicates is difficult to predict beyond securing new capital flows and methods of capital preservation. There is little evidence of any coherent political ideology guiding syndicates’ decisions. Some leaders have professed unusual political philosophies and religious doctrine, but it is unclear if these are authentic beliefs or intentional diversions.

Syndicates have no founding documents or philosophies, and no constitutions. At least, not yet.

While it would be interesting to psychoanalyze the leaders of syndicates, because their motivations may be pathological rather than political, that is a task for the psychologists. (Good luck.)

Cases

Some world events dominate our memory, despite involving less prominent figures or human casualties than others: the 1953 coup in Iran, the kidnapping of Patty Hearst, 9/11, billionaires going to space, and Jeffrey Epstein’s failed prosecution(s), just to name a few. Events like these are remembered as extraordinary for one reason: they do not fit the mould of how we know the world works (or so we thought). They feel like unbelievable anomalies, and occupy an outsized portion of our imaginations. That is because these cases exemplify a new world order emerging: they are all instances of syndicates of capital exercising more power than states.

Over the coming days and weeks, I will be publishing a series of detailed essays that explore cases that demonstrate how syndicates of capital gained power over the last 100 years, and how they operate today.

I will devote a lot of time to doing interviews and fulfilling media requests in order to spread and further develop this thesis. Send any requests to kaburbank.inquiry@gmail.com

Dedication:

For Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, Patrice Lumumba, Kent Klitgaard, Stephen Kinzer, and Warren Mosler.

Dear reader,

Thank you for taking the time to read this essay. People like me don’t usually get to learn about how power is organized in the world, let alone write about it. I come from a regular working class family, and was the first in my household to get a college degree, let alone go to graduate school.

Over the holidays, my dad was telling stories about his younger days. While driving a box truck around Manhattan, doing deliveries, he walked into the lobby of a building, and was stopped by security.

Walking to meet him at the door, the guard said, “deliveries are around back!” Then he pointed to the door, shooing my dad away like he was a sparrow that hopped through a motion-sensing door. The guard was incredulous that my modestly dressed father had the nerve to walk on the polished floors of their prestigious lobby, tainting the air of their corporate sanctuary with every cigarette-laced breath.

Every time I imagine my father’s warm smile falling, I get a lump in my throat. My dad would never tell a story for sympathy, and probably rejects whatever pity this invokes in others. Instead, he insinuates that these guys are pricks who’ve got it all wrong.

Like my father, I never quite accepted the world’s treatment of the lower class as lesser. Anyone who treats people poorly is an asshole. That’s an easy mentality to maintain at an interpersonal level. But once you start thinking about how systems are run, it gets complicated. You can’t dismiss the actions of someone who runs the economy. We live at their mercy.

In a stroke of luck, I got a leadership scholarship to Wells College. There, I met a man named Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo. He taught the class “Introduction to International Studies.” I was told it was the hardest class at Wells, and to wait until my 3rd of 4th year. I took it first semester freshman year.

One day, the upperclassman told me that Professor Lumumba-Kasongo’s uncle, Patrice Lumumba, was killed by the CIA, but he doesn’t like to talk about it. Nothing about how Tukumbi operates in the world or the classroom indicates his family has been betrayed in the most complicated way possible. Tukumbi is peaceful but intense, lighthearted but wise, and explains the world in a way that is simple but not simplistic.

Across every topic, Tukumbi ensures all relevant perspectives are presented, but never indicates which he favors. Even perspectives which, I now know, belong to those who orchestrated a murder in his family. His only passion is to spread a comprehensive understanding of the world, and power, to his students. A lot of who I am, I owe to Tukumbi.

When Pell Grants ran out, I didn’t enroll again in the fall. I took a job as a waitress and told my friends I was doing an internship. Tukumbi reached out, and made me his teaching assistant so I could return in the spring. I did, and eventually graduated on time with a double major in International Studies and Political Science.

Before graduation, Tukumbi asked what graduate schools I was applying to. He suggested Brown, Columbia, Harvard, etc. But, I hadn’t considered going to graduate school at all, let alone an Ivy. I thought he was delusional.

I went back to bartending, and applied to a few programs. On my last day behind the bar, my manager said to me: “don’t get so smart that you’re stupid.” I never forgot that. I could’ve used my prestigious education to do so many stupid things. Like taking a corporate job to save a bunch of money. I never sold out to the man. Not even ideologically. I was a bit of a menace to the posh professors.

At Brown, I met Stephen Kinzer. I was hired to be the teaching assistant for his sensationally popular class, “The History of U.S. Intervention.” Admittedly, I learned more working on Stephen’s course than I did in some of the graduate-level courses – including some new things about Patrice Lumumba’s assassination.

If it weren’t for my mentors’ dedication to liberatory education, I wouldn’t be who I am today. They never cared about my family’s legacy. Instead of patronizing me for the shitty public school education I came in with, they treated me like everyone else, and valued me for trying harder.

It’s the honor of my lifetime to follow in their footsteps, empowering people of all backgrounds to critically analyze power and gain access to information that refutes the relentless propaganda of our modern age. It is our right to understand the world we live in.

The study of power no longer belongs to the powerful.

1. EU-Democratic Republic of Congo Bilateral Development Cooperation, GSP Hub, January 28, 2026.

https://gsphub.eu/country-info/Democratic%20Republic%20of%20Congo

2. CIA Memorandum, February 14, 1972.

https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/top06.pdf

3. U.S. Senate, Intelligence Activities, Select Committee To Study Intergovernmental Operations, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report, November 18, 1975, Declassified August 15, 2002.

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/cia-rdp83-01042r000200090002-0.pdf

4. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Understanding International Conflicts, 7th ed. (New York, NY: Longman, 2008), pp 2-4.

5. Max Weber, Speech at Munich University, 1918, Originally published in 1919 by Duncker & Humblot, Munich, ‘Politik als Beruf,’ Gesammelte Politische Schriften (München, 1921), pp. 396-450.

6. Ibid, pp. 8.

7. Harry I. Chernotsky and Heidi H. Hobbs, Crossing Borders: International Studies for the 21st Century, 4th Edition, SAGE, 2022. pp. 84